-- Regards, Richard Jackson rjackson_at_portal.gmu.edu (5) It's happening in the US as well. :-( I got back from vacation last week to discover that someone had been using my system (among others) to send the things. I've removed sendsys from my news software, so it's not going anywhere, but I'm still seeing error messages that indicate that they're still trying. My log files aren't showing anything abnormal, so I can only assume that some outside party is either posting it via one of the systems I normally get news feeds from, or is spoofing them to put it into my NNTP queue. Unfortunately I haven't found anything to suggest where its coming from. If I had, I'd start by contacting the sys admin people at the system where it originates. Kathryn Smith KSMITH_at_LL.MIT.EDU (6) I long ago disabled processing of such messages. Anthony Talltree aad_at_nw.verio.net (7) We were both victim and conduit of the sendsys SPAM. On Friday, August 14 I saw numerous syslog messages on our news server caused by being out of process slots. Investigating, I found my machine clogged with invocations of sendmail caused by receiving sendsys control messages from parts unknown, and the sendsys output was being sent to numerous e-mail addresses. I opened a ticket with our network service provider, but he wasn't able to help with determining the source of the sendsys (he wanted to do traces at the IP level in the router, which is not helpful). So, I disabled sendsys processing on my machine by renaming the file NEWSPATH/bin/control/sendsys to something else. This eliminated the ability of the perptrator to use my machine to send the SPAM to his victimes. I also disabled some code in parsecontrol to prevent my news admin account from receiving e-mail telling me that the sendsys command was invalid. The following Tuesday, August 18, I received several reports that someone on my machine was initiating sendsys commands. I found that the IP address 38.11.197.220 was the originator of the attack and opened a ticket with psi.net to have the perpetrator shot down. We let him stay on long enough to determine that he was using the normal NNTP POST procedure to inject the control messages into the net. I put temporary nnrp.access restrictions on the IP address blocks in Dallas and Ft. Worth, TX where he was originating, and modified the source for for INN inews.c and nnrpd post.c to prevent the processing of messages containing the Control: header, the Supersedes: header, and any Subject line beginning with the string "cmsg". (The same guy was attacking net-abuse newsgroups by using the Supersedes: header to replace the content of postings he didn't like.) This appears to be effective for blocking the initiation of the attack. Peter Olson PETER_at_delphi.com ------------------------------------------------ Dennis Macdonell | Systems Administrator | AUSLIG | "Any idiot can face em: mcdonell_at_auslig.gov.au | a crisis - its this ph: 02 6201 4326 | day-to-day living fax: 02 6201 4377 | that wears you out" ------------------------------------------------Received on Mon Sep 07 1998 - 02:56:43 NZST
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