

First-Order Logic

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Based on “Artificial Intelligence”
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Chapter 8

- Why FOL?
- Syntax and semantics of FOL
- Fun with sentences
- Wumpus world in FOL

First-order logic

- Whereas propositional logic assumes the world contains just **facts**, first-order logic assumes it also contains
 - **Objects:** people, houses, numbers, theories, Ronald McDonald, colors, baseball games, wars, centuries, ...
 - **Relations:** red, round, bogus, prime, multi storied, ..., brother of, bigger than, inside, part of, has color, occurred after, owns, comes between, ...
 - **Functions:** father of, best friend, third inning of, one more than, beginning of, ...

Syntax of FOL: Basic elements

Constants	<i>KingJohn, 2, ...</i>
Predicates	<i>Brother, >, ...</i>
Functions	<i>Sqrt, LeftLegOf, ...</i>
Variables	<i>x, y, a, b, ...</i>
Connectives	$\wedge \vee \neg \Rightarrow \Leftrightarrow$
Equality	$=$
Quantifiers	$\forall \exists$

Atomic sentences

Atomic sentence = $predicate(term_1, \dots, term_n)$
or $term_1 = term_2$

Term = $function(term_1, \dots, term_n)$
or *constant* or *variable*

E.g., $Brother(KingJohn, RichardTheLionheart)$
> $(Length(LeftLegOf(Richard)), Length(LeftLegOf(KingJohn)))$

Complex sentences

- Complex sentences are made from atomic sentences using connectives

$$\neg S, \quad S_1 \wedge S_2, \quad S_1 \vee S_2, \quad S_1 \Rightarrow S_2, \quad S_1 \Leftrightarrow S_2$$

E.g. $Sibling(KingJohn, Richard) \Rightarrow Sibling(Richard, KingJohn)$


$$>(1, 2) \vee \leq(1, 2)$$

$$>(1, 2) \wedge \neg >(1, 2)$$

Truth in first-order logic

- Sentences are true with respect to a **model** and an **interpretation**
- Model contains objects and relations among them
- Interpretation specifies referents for
 - *constant symbols* \rightarrow objects
 - *predicate symbols* \rightarrow relations
 - *function symbols* \rightarrow functional relations
- An atomic sentence $predicate(term_1, \dots, term_n)$ is true iff the objects referred to by $term_1, \dots, term_n$ are in the relation referred to by *predicate*

Models for FOL: Example



Universal quantification

- $\forall \langle \text{variables} \rangle \langle \text{sentence} \rangle$
- Everyone at Waikato is smart: $\forall x At(x, Waikato) \Rightarrow Smart(x)$
- Roughly speaking, $\forall x P$ is equivalent to the conjunction of instantiations of P

$$At(KingJohn, Waikato) \Rightarrow Smart(KingJohn)$$

$$\wedge At(Richard, Waikato) \Rightarrow Smart(Richard)$$

$$\wedge At(Waikato, Waikato) \Rightarrow Smart(Waikato)$$

$$\wedge \dots$$

A common mistake to avoid

- Typically, \Rightarrow is the main connective with \forall .
- Common mistake: using \wedge as the main connective with \forall :

$$\forall x At(x, Waikato) \wedge Smart(x)$$

means “Everyone is at Waikato and everyone is smart”

Existential quantification

- $\exists \langle \text{variables} \rangle \langle \text{sentence} \rangle$
- Someone at Otago is smart: $\exists x At(x, Otago) \wedge Smart(x)$
- Roughly speaking, $\exists x P$ is equivalent to the disjunction of instantiations of P

$At(KingJohn, Otago) \wedge Smart(KingJohn)$

$\vee At(Richard, Otago) \wedge Smart(Richard)$

$\vee At(Otago, Otago) \wedge Smart(Otago)$

$\vee \dots$

Another common mistake to avoid

- Typically, \wedge is the main connective with \exists .
- Common mistake: using \Rightarrow as the main connective with \exists :

$$\exists x At(x, Otago) \Rightarrow Smart(x)$$

is true if there is anyone who is not at Otago!

Properties of quantifiers

- $\forall x\forall y$ is the same as $\forall y\forall x$
- $\exists x\exists y$ is the same as $\exists y\exists x$
- $\exists x\forall y$ is not the same as $\forall y\exists x$
- $\exists x\forall y\text{Loves}(x, y)$
“There is a person who loves everyone in the world”
- $\forall y\exists x\text{Loves}(x, y)$
“Everyone in the world is loved by at least one person”
- Quantifier duality: each can be expressed using the other
 - $\forall x\text{Likes}(x, \text{IceCream})$ $\neg\exists x\neg\text{Likes}(x, \text{IceCream})$
 - $\exists x\text{Likes}(x, \text{Broccoli})$ $\neg\forall x\neg\text{Likes}(x, \text{Broccoli})$

Fun with sentences

- Brothers are siblings
 - ?
- “Sibling” is reflexive
 - ?
- One’s mother is one’s female parent
 - ?
- A first cousin is a child of a parent’s sibling
 - ?

Fun with sentences

- Brothers are siblings
 - $\forall x, y \text{Brother}(x, y) \Rightarrow \text{Sibling}(x, y)$
- “Sibling” is reflexive
 - $\forall x, y \text{Sibling}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \text{Sibling}(y, x)$
- One’s mother is one’s female parent
 - $\forall x, y \text{Mother}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow (\text{Female}(x) \wedge \text{Parent}(x, y))$
- A first cousin is a child of a parent’s sibling
 - $\forall x, y \text{FirstCousin}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow$
 $\exists p, ps \text{Parent}(p, x) \wedge \text{Sibling}(ps, p) \wedge \text{Parent}(ps, y)$

Equality

- $term_1 = term_2$ is true under a given interpretation if and only if $term_1$ and $term_2$ refer to the same object

- E.g., definition of *Sibling* in terms of *Parent*:

$$\forall x, y \text{Sibling}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow [\neg(x = y) \wedge \exists m, f \neg(m = f) \wedge \text{Parent}(m, x) \wedge \text{Parent}(f, x) \wedge \text{Parent}(m, y) \wedge \text{Parent}(f, y)]$$

Interacting with FOL KBs

- Suppose a wumpus-world agent is using an FOL KB and perceives a smell and a breeze (but no glitter) at $t = 5$:
 - $\text{TELL}(KB, \text{Percept}([\text{Smell}, \text{Breeze}, \text{Glitter}], 5))$
 - $\text{ASK}(KB, \exists a \text{Action}(a, 5))$
- Answer: *Yes*, $\{a/\text{Grab}\}$ ← substitution (binding list)
- Given a sentence S and a substitution σ , $S\sigma$ denotes the result of plugging σ into S ; e.g.,
 $S = \text{Smarter}(x, y)$
 $\sigma = \{x/\text{Hillary}, y/\text{Bill}\}$
 $S\sigma = \text{Smarter}(\text{Hillary}, \text{Bill})$
- $\text{ASK}(KB, S)$ returns some/all σ such that $KB \models S\sigma$

Knowledge base for the wumpus world

- “Perception”

$$\forall b, g, t \text{Percept}([Smell, b, g], t) \Rightarrow Smelled(t)$$

$$\forall s, b, t \text{Percept}([s, b, Glitter], t) \Rightarrow AtGold(t)$$

- Reflex: $\forall t AtGold(t) \Rightarrow Action(Grab, t)$

- Reflex with internal state: do we have the gold already?

$$\forall t AtGold(t) \wedge \neg Holding(Gold, t) \Rightarrow Action(Grab, t)$$

- $Holding(Gold, t)$ cannot be observed
 \Rightarrow keeping track of change is essential

Deducing hidden properties

- Properties of locations:

$$\forall l, t \text{At}(\text{Agent}, l, t) \wedge \text{Smelled}(t) \Rightarrow \text{Smelly}(l)$$

$$\forall l, t \text{At}(\text{Agent}, l, t) \wedge \text{Breeze}(t) \Rightarrow \text{Breezy}(l)$$

- Squares are breezy near a pit:

- Diagnostic rule—infer cause from effect

$$\forall y \text{Breezy}(y) \Rightarrow \exists x \text{Pit}(x) \wedge \text{Adjacent}(x, y)$$

- Causal rule—infer effect from cause

$$\forall x, y \text{Pit}(x) \wedge \text{Adjacent}(x, y) \Rightarrow \text{Breezy}(y)$$

- Neither of these is complete—e.g., the causal rule doesn't say whether squares far away from pits can be breezy

- Definition for the *Breezy* predicate:

$$\forall y \text{Breezy}(y) \Leftrightarrow [\exists x \text{Pit}(x) \wedge \text{Adjacent}(x, y)]$$